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SELF-LOVE AND 
THE VICES OF SELF-PREFERENCE* 
Robert Merrihew Adams 
The paper explores the extent to which self-love, as understood by Bishop 
Butler, may be in harmony with altruistic virtue. Whereas Butler was primari-
ly concerned to rebut suspicions directed against altruism, the suspicions prin-
cipally addressed by the present writer are directed against self-love. It is 
argued that the main vices of self-preference- particularly selfishness, self-
centeredness, and arrogance-are not essentially excesses of self-love and, 
indeed, do not necessarily involve self-love. lt is argued further that self-love 
is something one is typically taught as a child, for socially compelling reasons. 
This suggests how a healthy self-love and a healthy commitment to the com-
mon good can be integrated and will normally be in harmony. 
1. Butler and the Harmony of Self-Love with Benevolence 
Is moral virtue altruistic in such a way that there cannot be any place in 
it for self-love? Or is there a possible harmony of self-interest with altru-
ism and with virtue? Discussion of this topic in English finds a natural 
starting point is in the work of Joseph Butler, and especially in his 
famous Sermon XI, "Upon the Love of Our Neighbour," where he 
argues that it cannot be to our advantage for self-love to absorb us so 
totally as to leave no room for the love of our neighbor. Butler conceives 
of self-love as "a regard to [one's] own interest, happiness, and private 
good" (XI.8),1 by which he means one's good in the long run, compre-
hensively considered. Butler distinguishes self- love from "particular 
appetites and passions," which are desires for objects "distinct from the 
pleasure arising from them." Indeed the object gives pleasure only 
because there is a prior "affection or appetite" for it, according to Butler 
(XI.6). He argues that therefore 
if self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other prin-
ciple, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as happiness, or 
enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness consists in the gratifi-
cation of particular passions, which supposes the having of them (XI.9). 
It is therefore advantageous to our happiness to have particular passions 
or desires for objects quite distinct from our happiness. Without them 
we would have nothing to be happy about. 
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From the point of view of self-love, Butler argues, benevolence 
toward another person has this advantage just as much as a desire to be 
loved or esteemed by the other person-though the latter is commonly 
seen as a more self-interested desire than the former. He treats benevo-
lence in this context (though not always) as one of the particular pas-
sions, having another person's happiness as its objecU The other per-
son's happiness can be a source of pleasure or happiness to me, if I 
desire it and learn of its reality in the other person. "ls desire of and 
delight in the happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love, 
than desire of and delight in the esteem of another?" Butler asks. "They 
are both equally desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves: 
either both or neither are so" (XLII). 
It is not my purpose to examine this justly celebrated argument. 
Bishop Butler's treatment of the nature and sources of pleasure requires 
some amendment/ which need not be attempted here; and any adequate 
amendment may well affect the force of the argument. But I do not 
doubt the correctness of the theses, first, that one can hardly live a 
happy life without strong and more than merely instrumental desires for 
ends distinct from one's own happiness, and second, that the happiness 
or good of other persons is among the ends best suited to play this part 
in a happy person's life. 
We must be clear that such considerations cannot establish an auto-
matic harmony of self-love and benevolence for everyone. At most they 
provide grounds to believe in the desirability, and to hope in the possibil-
ity, of people becoming such that self-love and benevolence are in harmo-
ny for them. An attractive story about Butler may help to make this 
point vivid. It is said that once, being asked for a charitable contribution, 
and learning from his steward, upon inquiry, that he had £500 on hand, 
Butler replied, "Five hundred pounds! What a shame for a bishop to 
have so much money! Give it away; give it all to this gentleman for his 
charitable p1an."~ One imagines that Butler enjoyed doing this-perhaps 
more than he would have enjoyed any other use of the money, but it is 
obvious that someone with different interests might not have enjoyed it. 
The harmony of self-love with benevolence, as Butler conceives of it, 
depends on having, and perhaps cultivating, the right interests. 
To some extent it may also depend on a relatively unalienated mem-
bership in some social group-an advantage sadly inaccessible to some 
people. Bishop Butler was in many ways at home in his social context, 
and his main personal projects seem to have been at the same time social 
or even public projects. He was fortunate to be able to find his own hap-
piness in seeking the good of his church and his people. To a far greater 
extent than one would gather from Butler, the possible harmony of self-
love with benevolence requires social as well as individual foundations/ 
even where it involves a deeper altruism than results from rewarding 
egoistic individuals for socially useful behavior. 
We shall find Butler helpful at several points in the present investiga-
tion. Throughout it I shall use the term 'self-love', as he did, to signify 
the desire for one's own long-term happiness or good on the whole. But 
my aim here is not properly historical and I offer no systematic exposi-
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tion or critique of Butler's moral theory. My focus indeed is rather dif-
ferent from his. 
Much of Butler's argument was directed against the egoistic moral 
theory of Thomas Hobbes, and was meant to commend a life of consci-
entiousness and benevolence to an audience for whom self-love was 
"the favourite passion," as he put it (XL3). In this paper, however, I 
shall be addressing concerns that come from the opposite direction; for I 
want particularly to ask how far self-love can be cleared of the suspicion 
under which it lies in ordinary moral opinion. Karl Barth surely speaks 
for many when he says of self-love, "God will never think of blowing on 
this fire, which is bright enough already."6 So does Iris Murdoch when 
she declares that "In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego."7 
Even Butler says that "vice in general consists in having an unreasonable 
and too great regard to ourselves, in comparison of others" (X.6), though 
he also holds that "self-love in its due degree is as just and morally 
good, as any affection whatever" (Preface, §·39). 
Vices of self-preference, such as selfishness and pride, are rightly 
among the chief objects of moral censure. Our understanding of them is 
not enhanced, however, by an oversimple dichotomization of morally 
relevant motivation into desire for one's own good and desire for other 
people's good. I"want to explore here some of the complexity that belies 
this dichotomy. This complexity, I shall argue, does support a possible 
harmony of self-love with altruistic virtue. 
2. Selfishness 
One of Butler's insights is that the role of self- love in actual human 
motivation has been exaggerated. So far as I can see, the main vices of 
self-preference do not necessarily involve self-love. Selfishness is the one 
we are probably most tempted to identify with a degree of self-love that 
is too great, either absolutely or in proportion to the strength of one's 
altruistic and conscientious motivation. This identification cannot be 
right, however, for selfishness is clearly possible without any degree of 
self-love at all. 
One of the virtues of Butler's account of self- love is that it makes 
clear that self-love is a rational achievement. One cannot desire one's 
long- term happiness or good on the whole without having a concept of 
that good. And that is not an easy concept. This is not the place to 
expound a full conception, Butler's or mine, of a person's good; and I 
would not necessarily wish to defend all of Butler's views on the subject. 
One feature of Butler's conception of a person's good that seems to me 
clearly right particularly concerns us here; it is that the conception is an 
instrument of rational self- government, and can play that role because it 
is a rather comprehensive conception in which many interests, and the 
person's whole future, are taken into account. 
We are not born with such a concept. It is not even among the first 
concepts we learned. I had the concept of "my teddy bear" some time 
before I had the concept of "my life," let alone the concept of "my long-
term good on the whole," and thus before I had the conceptual resources 
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necessary for self-love in Butler's sense. But by the time I had the con-
cept of limy teddy bear" I was certainly capable of being selfish in vari-
ous ways. That selfishness cannot have been an excess of the self-love of 
which I was as yet incapable. 
What was it then? Or more broadly, what would selfishness be 
where it is not an excess of self-love (as I will not deny that it can be)? 
The obvious Butlerian answer is that selfishness can consist in some dis-
order of the "particular passions" -some lack or weakness of benevolent 
passions, or some excess of self-regarding passions, or both. These ideas 
are nicely combined, though without the use of the word 'selfishness', in 
Butler's statement that 
The thing to be lamented, is not that men have so great regard to 
their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not 
enough; but that they have so little to the good of others. And 
this seems plainly owing to their being so much engaged in the 
gratification of particular passions unfriendly to benevolence, and 
which happen to be prevalent in them, much more than to self-
love. (Preface, § 40)8 
The idea of "particular passions unfriendly to benevolence" invites 
further elaboration. A charge of selfishness implies some lack of due 
regard to something other than oneself, and this will commonly involve 
a lack of benevolence. What is benevolence here? A "regard ... to the 
good of others" is easily construed as a concern for the comprehensive, 
long-term good of at least one other person, if not the even more com-
prehensive utilitarian "greatest good of the greatest number." It is true 
that a lack of regard to the comprehensive good of others is apt to be 
censured as selfish in adults, but that cannot exactly be what constitutes 
selfishness in very young children. For if their selfishness is a lack, it 
must surely be a lack of something that is not utterly beyond their con-
ceptual capacities. And they are not capable of regard to the long-term 
good of other people as such, having no more conception of it than of 
their own long- term good. If selfishness is a lack in very young chil-
dren, it must be a lack of some passion more particular than a compre-
hensive regard to the good of another person. Which unselfish passions 
of this more particular sort ought not to be lacking in very young chil-
dren? We might look for concern about the pleasure or pain, satisfaction 
or frustration experienced at present by another person." 
The possibilities for unselfish motives in adults are obviously more 
varied. One variety that deserves some emphasis here is the possibility 
of unselfish desires that are not concerned with other people as such, but 
with common projects. iil If I am too wrapped up in private concerns to 
care about the quality of work done in my philosophy department, that 
may well be regarded as selfish, even though the concern in which I am 
deficient is not for my colleagues and students as persons, but for a com-
mon project in which they are interested. Perhaps the most we can say 
quite generally about the omission aspect of selfishness is that selfish-
ness necessarily involves insufficient regard for other people or for 
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something in which other people are interested. 
There is more to be said about the lip articular passions unfriendly to 
benevolence" whose excessive prevalance would constitute selfishness, 
and which we have yet to identify. fspeak of the excessive prevalence 
of the passions in question, for I think there are few desires or interests 
that are inherently or necessarily selfish. Selfishness lies not in caring 
about one's own comfort or one's stamp collection, but in letting oneself 
be governed inappropriately or too strongly by such interests. That 
seems to be the typical relation of selfishness to its motives, though there 
are doubtless exceptions to the general rule- desires that are inherently 
selfish. W. H. Auden wrote of the "crude," but in his opinion "nor-
mal," wish that "craves ... not universal love, but to be loved alone."ll 
That certainly seems to be an essentially selfish desire. 
Which of the passions that may oppose benevolence can ground a 
charge of selfishness if one is too much governed by them? Not all, I 
think. 'Malicious' rather than 'selfish' seems the word for sheer ill-will 
toward another person, from which, as Butler notes, one may "rush 
upon certain ruin for the destruction of an enemy" (XU 1), desiring 
the other person's pain or loss regardless of what happens to oneself. 
The motives of selfishness involve wanting something for oneself. 
In what way must it be for oneself? It seems safe to say at a minimum 
that motives of selfishness must be self-regarding in the sense of having 
an object involving oneself that is desired or intended at least partly for 
its own sake, and not merely as a means to some other end. But this is 
not a terribly restrictive condition. The class of self-regarding motives is 
very wide-so wide that they are probably involved in almost all our 
actions. Desiring a relationship for its own sake-whether one desires 
the continuance of one's marriage, or to be a good parent or friend to so-
and- so-is always a self-regarding motive, inasmuch as the relationship 
essentially involves oneself. Likewise conscientiousness is a self-regard-
ing motive, inasmuch as it is a commitment to act rightly oneself-a point 
that is reflected in recent characterizations of de ontological constraints 
as agent-centered. 
A more difficult question is whether motives of selfishness have some 
necessary connection with the idea of a good for oneself. Let us say that 
a narrowlt/ self-interested motive is one in which one desires or intends 
something at least partly for the sake of one's own comprehensive, long-
term good. It is an expression of self-love in Butler's sense. Even if 
motives of selfishness must be self-regarding, I have argued that they 
are not always narrowly self-interested. But it is harder to refute the 
hypothesis that they must be, if not narrowly, then broadly self-interested, 
in the sense that they must aim at something that is (or is taken to be) 
good for oneself, in the short term or in some respect, if not in the long 
term and comprehensively. 
This hypothesis might be suggested by thinking of greed, which is 
probably the motive most frequently branded as selfish. The child 
behaving selfishly may be dominated by a desire to control a particular 
toy, or to eat the whole of a particular piece of cake. Adults are capable 
of a more comprehensive greed, for money or wealth in general. The 
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object of greed, particular or general, is not one's own good as such, but 
it is generally seen as a good, in some way, for its possessor, and as a 
good that exists in limited supply and is desired by or for other people 
as well as oneself. The phenomena of greed present us with many cases 
of selfishness from motives that are broadly but not narrowly self-inter-
ested, as when someone who knows he is eating more than is good for 
him takes more than his fair share of food in order to have the pleasure 
of eating it. 
The hypothesis that in selfishness one always aims at some good for 
oneself requires at least some qualifications. Your judgment that some-
one acts selfishly from a certain desire does not necessarily commit you 
to the view that the object desired is truly good for the desirer even in 
the short run or in any respect. If you think someone is selfishly con-
trolled by a desire for posthumous fame, it does not follow that you hold 
the controversial opinion that posthumous fame can be in some way 
good for a person. If the question is whether my quest for posthumous 
glory is selfish, probably my opinion as to whether it would be a good 
for me is more relevant than yours. But my opinion is not decisive 
either, in such a case. Clearly one can be selfishly moved by a desire 
without having any opinion as to whether the object of the desire would 
be a good of any sort for oneself, since children can be selfish before they 
have the concept of something being good for a person in any way 
<though probably not before they have, at least in rudimentary form, 
related concepts such as those of pleasure and pain). And surely it may 
be counted as selfish to be overly dominated by a desire for such objects 
as pleasure, convenience, wealth, or reputation, independently of any 
opinion on the part of either the classifier or the possessor of the motive, 
as to whether the object is truly good in any way, even in the short term, 
for the person in question, or for anyone else. Of course all these objects 
are regarded by many as good for a person, at least in the short run or in 
some respect; so our readiness to accept them as figuring in motives of 
selfishness might be explained as deference to public opinion, and thus 
as not shaking the connection of selfishness with the idea of a good for 
oneself. 
One reason for the difficulty of shaking it is that so few self-regarding 
motives are clearly not broadly self-interested. Perhaps self-destructive 
motives, such as self-hatred, provide the most plausible case of self-
regarding motives that do not aim at anything that is good for oneself 
from any point of view. Consider, then, the question of selfishness in 
the following pair of examples. It is often thought selfish to abandon 
certain responsibilities by committing suicide in order to avoid a situa-
tion painful to oneself. A voiding the pain is a good for oneself, at least 
in the short run. Would it be thought selfish to abandon the same 
responsibilities by committing suicide out of sheer self-hatred, desiring 
nothing that anyone would call a good for oneself? Certainly such 
action can be subject to moral censure- for instance, as irresponsible. 
Moreover, it manifests an excessive concern with oneself; it is probably 
self-centered. In trying to talk the self-hater out of suicide, one might 
perhaps argue that it would be selfish to abandon the responsibilities in 
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order to act on one's feelings about oneself. Yet in a cooler hour I might 
hesitate to call it selfish, precisely because the motive is hostile rather 
than friendly toward oneself. Perhaps it does not matter much whether 
we avoid the label' selfish' here. Self-destructive behavior is commonly 
very harmful to other people, and it seems no better morally to engage 
in it from sheer self-hatred than from desire for some short-term good 
for oneself.'2 
So I am not sure that selfishness necessarily involves a desire for any-
thing regarded by anyone as a good for oneself. But in some of our judg-
ments of selfishness it does seem to matter whether the offending 
motive aims at a good for its possessor. For example, consider someone 
who always insists on assuming the most burdensome role in any situa-
tion, even when there are others who are willing to do it and it is clear 
that it would be better for all concerned if one of them did it. 'Selfish' 
does not seem the right word for such a person, but it does seem the 
right word for someone who is too unwilling to assume burdensome 
roles; and this contrast applies even when the two attitudes are equally 
inconvenient for others. The most salient difference between the two 
cases is that the selfish person is seeking an obvious good for himself, 
and the other person is not. 
One further point is particularly important for the relation between 
selfishness and self-love. Whether we think people selfish or unselfish 
often depends less on the strength of their self-love than on the character 
of the interests or "particular passions" in which they seek their happi-
ness. There are interests in which people find happiness, and whose 
pursuit therefore is typically both broadly and narrowly self-interested, 
but which are regarded as unselfish interests-for instance, the desire to 
be a parent, when it is embraced with sufficient maturity. Conversely, 
people who take no delight in any but the most narrowly self-regarding 
interests do not have an exemplary unselfish character even if they are 
willing to sacrifice those interests when duty or the common good 
demands it. And people with strong enough interests in other people 
and in public or ideal ends may be notably unselfish even if almost 
everything they do contributes also to their own happiness, as seems to 
have been the case in Bishop Butler's life. In this connection one might 
speak of a selfish or unselfish conception of one's own good. 
3. Self-Centeredness and Vices of Cognitive Self-Preference 
A particularly important self-regarding desire which it usually is not 
exactly selfish to carry to excess, even at others' expense, is the desire to 
be a good person, the desire for virtue. It is possible to be overly con-
cerned, or concerned in an objectionable way, with one's own virtue. 
This is the case in the vices of self-righteousness and moral priggishness. 
And people who refuse to do something morally questionable in order 
to attain some great good or avoid some great evil are often accused of 
selfishness in their desire for "clean hands." rdoubt the correctness of 
the charge of selfishness in such cases, unless the agent is moved by 
mere delicacy of feeling, rather than by a belief that it would be wrong 
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to do what he refuses to do. It is never selfish, I think, to refuse consci-
entiously to do something that really is wrong; and even where a mis-
guided conscientiousness leads one to abstain from an action that really 
is morally required, 'selfish' does not seem quite the right word for 
one's motivation. 
Perhaps 'self-centered' would be a better description. To want to be a 
good person is to desire something unquestionably good. One can hard-
ly want it too much. Yet it does seem that this motive can be distorted, 
and its value compromised, by some sort of excessive consideration of 
self. The difference between a wholesome and a self-centered desire for 
virtue, I think, is not primarily in the end that is desired. What is 
desired in both cases may be the same: to be a good person. The differ-
ence is rather in emphasis, or in the place that one's wanting to be good 
has in a larger pattern of thinking and feeling. If one's desire for virtue 
is self-centered, one is likely to be thinking often about how good one is, 
or filled with anxiety about one's moral shortcomings, or comparing 
one's moral qualities to other people's; whereas a purer love of virtue 
might be manifested in thinking more about virtue in general, and 
admiring the good qualities of other people, without reference or com-
parison to oneself. 
This difference in one's thinking, in one's attention,l] is virtually cer-
tain to affect one's judgment on moral issues. The self-centered interest 
in one's own virtue, we think, is apt to distort judgment, making it likeli-
er that one will be mistaken in one's beliefs about what virtue requires. 
In this way the difference between a self-centered and a purer desire for 
virtue is likely to issue in differences in the detail of what one wants for 
oneself. These differences in the object of desire are not primary, how-
ever, but derive from a more fundamental difference in focus. 
Self-centeredness is a vice of self-preference that is distinguishable 
from selfishness. The feature of self-centeredness that most interests me 
here is that it is not in general to be understood in terms of what one 
wants. The simplistic dichotomy of egoism and altruism commonly car-
ries with it the assumption that any vice of self-preference is a matter of 
what one wants. Self-centeredness is a counterexample to this assump-
tion. There may be desires that are essentially self-centered; perhaps the 
desire to be the center of attention is one such. But most good relation-
ships between oneself and other people, or between oneself and values 
or ideal ends, can be desired, for their own sake, in both more and less 
self-centered ways. 
A homelier example may help to confirm this point. Suppose Daddy 
is planning to shoot baskets with Susie. Daddy desires the following 
state of affairs, and desires it at least partly for its own sake: Daddy and 
Susie shoot baskets together; both have fun; both take the activity seri-
ously; and both do their best. Daddy will be disappointed if either of 
them fails to enjoy it, and if either of them does badly. This character-
izes Daddy's desire in both of the following versions of the example: 
Case (1): As Daddy contemplates the planned recreation, his mind 
runs to thoughts such as ''I'm really being a very good father," 'Tm still 
very good at this, considering my age," "I wish my dad had done this 
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with me," "Susie will get a kick out of this because I'm spending time 
with her." He forgets to ask her what she did in school today. 
Case (2): As Daddy contemplates the planned recreation, his mind 
runs to thoughts such as "Susie has so much fun shooting baskets," 
"She's getting really good at it," "Susie's a neat kid." He remembers to 
ask what she did in school today. 
Other things being equal, these descriptions give reason for saying 
that Daddy's interest in shooting baskets with Susie is more self-cen-
tered in Case (1) than in Case (2). And this does not seem to be primari-
ly a difference in the ends that Daddy desires. Though Daddy desires 
this recreational activity at least partly for its own sake, it is likely that in 
both cases he has a number of ulterior ends in wanting it, and that in 
both cases these include his being a good father, his getting some exer-
cise, Susie's physical and social development, and their having a good 
relationship. The difference between the two cases is rather a difference 
in focus. In wanting a largely relational complex of ends essentially 
involving oneself it is possible for one's interest to be centered over-
whelmingly on one's own role in the complex, or much more on other 
persons, or other features, involved in it. Self-centeredness, as its name 
suggests, is typically a perversion in this sort of centering. 
My account of self-centeredness has emphasized the thoughts one 
has. In many cases, !"think, self- centered ness is a perversion of cogni-
tion as much as of the will. And certainly there are vices of cognitive 
self-preference, such as pride, conceit, or egotism. I I One of Butler's ser-
mons is largely devoted to the distortions of moral perception and judg-
ment that arise from cognitive "self-partiality" (X,7), particularly as it is 
manifested in a disposition not to recognize one's own moral faults. Still 
more offensive than such blindness to one's own sins is the arrogance of 
thinking of oneself as more important than other people. I mean not 
merely caring more about one's own good, and one's own projects, than 
a bout those of other people, but seeing oneself as objectively more 
important than others, thinking one's own problems and goals more 
urgent morally than theirs. 
These faults could be motivated by one's desire for one's own good, or 
by more particular self- regarding desires. One may not recognize one's 
faults because one does not want to think of oneself as wrong, or perhaps 
because one fears that guilt would deprive one of the long-term happi-
ness one desires. But it is not obvious that vices of cognitive self-prefer-
ence always have such an explanation in terms of desire; and they are not 
themselves forms of any desire. That is, they are not tendencies to go for 
a particular end, but are rather tendencies to judge in certain ways and 
form certain views of things. And it may be clearer that certain judg-
ments or views are arrogant, conceited, or egotistic, than that any desires 
that may motivate them are morally objectionable. If I tend to think of 
myself more highly than I ought, that vice may well have among its caus-
es a desire to have the excellences that I fondly imagine myself as hav-
ing-a desire that makes it painful to face the sad truth of how far short 
of them I fall. But that desire seems morally innocent, perhaps even 
laudable. The vice may have to be located in the cognitive functioning 
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that responds inappropriately to the desire." There is more than one way 
in which self can loom too large in one's life. It can loom too large in 
one's desires, but it can also loom too large in one's thoughts. And nei-
ther of these two forms of vice is merely a form of the other. 
For this reason it seems to me somewhat strained to characterize 
these vices as forms of selfishness.16 The word 'selfish' ordinarily signi-
fies something about one's desires, something about the ends one is 
going for. The vices of cognitive self-preference seem rather to be forms 
of the sin of pride, or perhaps in some cases of self-centered ness-if 
indeed they can be reduced at all to a small number of categories. 
Since they are not forms of any desire, it follows that these vices are 
not forms of self-love, if by 'self-love' we mean the desire for one's own 
long-term good. Indeed some of them do not presuppose a conception 
of one's own good, and hence can in principle exist without self-love-
though they may involve in their own way too much cognitive sophisti-
cation to exist in very young children. 
4. Unselfish Self-Love 
We have now seen at least two types of case in which vices of self-
preference cannot be identified with an excess of that desire for one's 
own long-term good which Butler called self-love. There are cases-
indeed quite typical cases-of selfishness in which the excessively domi-
nant desire is one of what Butler called the "particular passions," whose 
aims may not agree, in the particular case, with those of a rational self-
love. And there are vices of cognitive self- preference which are not 
forms of any desire. So is self-love innocent, or perhaps even virtuous? 
Sometimes but not always, is the short answer. A somewhat longer 
answer may begin with reflection on children's learning of self-love. We 
have noted that very young children are incapable of desiring their own 
long-term good because they have no conception of such a good. Much 
ethical thought has proceeded on the assumption that self-love is "natur-
al," or even an instinct in human beings. I suppose it is natural, in the 
rather minimal sense that we have a natural propensity to it, but it is not 
an instinct. Experience suggests that self-love is something a child is nor-
mally taught by its elders. None of us invented for ourselves the concept 
of our own happiness or good, which plays an essential part in self-love. 
There may be objective facts of human good, but the concept of one's 
own good is a product of human culture and socially transmitted-
something we acquired from those who came before us. 
Nor did we get it by merely observing their deliberations about their 
own good. Unless we were very unfortunate in our childhood circum-
stances, we were brought up by adults who had our long-term good as a 
project of theirs before it was a project of ours- indeed, before we had 
any conception of it. They recognized it as a project that could not get 
very far unless it became our project too. Therefore they taught us the 
concept of our own good with the intention that we should desire that 
good, explaining, for instance, that certain things were good for us and 
others bad for us. Teaching children to conceive of, and care for, their 
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own good is one of the main ways in which one cares for their good. 
Conversely, children who are undervalued by those who bring them up 
are apt to find it harder to adopt their own good with clarity and firm-
ness as a project of their own. 
In happier circumstances children's acquisition of self-love is an initi-
ation into a common project, a project they share with adults who love 
them. Like morally correct behavior, my own long-term good was not 
something I wanted to begin with. I"came to want both, with some 
ambivalence, as I learned about them from people about whom I cared 
who cared about both, and as I sensed the place of both in a whole net-
work of common projects into which I was being initiated. What was 
good for me-cod liver oil, for example-was about as likely to be 
unpleasant as what was morally required. I cannot recall that the appeal 
to enlightened self- interest enlisted a readier or more enthusiastic coop-
eration from me than the appeal to righteousness. Both of these appeals 
had to struggle against what Butler called "particular passions/, many 
of which I had long before I possessed the relatively complex conceptual 
apparatus necessary for self-love and conscientiousness. 
Against this background it should not surprise us that a good deal of 
self-love, in Butler's sense, is regularly treated as a moral virtue in chil-
dren. "Be a good boy and take your medicine; it's good for you." "Be a 
good girl and do your homework; it's important to your future success." 
In these injunctions an appraisal that certainly feels moral rides on a 
response to the motive of the agent's own long-term good. In many con-
texts children who take an effective interest in their own good are "being 
good," and children who don't are letting the side down, damaging a 
project in which others have invested much. 
Similar things can be said about adults. Butler remarks 
that there are as few persons who attain the greatest satisfaction 
and enjoyment which they might attain in the present world; as 
who do the greatest good to others which they might do: nay, 
that there are as few who can be said really and in earnest to aim at 
one, as at the other (1.14). 
For it so often happens that "cool self-love is prevailed over by passion 
and appetite" (1.14), whereas "self-love ..... is, of the two, a much better 
guide than passion" (Preface, §·41). A failure to pursue one's own good 
is perhaps less apt to be subjected to moral censure in adults than in 
children. But I think there is often a distinctly moral flavor to criticism 
of adults who neglect their own good through indiscipline or indolence. 
Differences in our attitudes toward a lack of self-love in adults and in 
children are connected with issues of responsibility and ownership. Part 
of what I learned about my own good as a child was that it was a project 
that was to belong to me in a special way: that as I got older I would 
have more and more responsibility for it, and others would take less and 
less responsibility for it. Linked with this was the fact that the form the 
project would take would be increasingly up to me. Likewise it would 
be more my own business if I neglected the project. Taking my own 
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good as a project that is mine in a special way was part of my learning 
and accepting my moral position in a complex web of rights and respon-
sibilities. At least in a broadly liberal Western society, one acquires 
more ownership of one's good, and it becomes less of a common project, 
as one grows to adulthood. 
But it never ceases entirely to be a common project in any society that 
is not completely heartless. If I am found near death in the street, I will 
be taken to a hospital. If I am starving and there is food around, an 
effort will probably be made to provide me with some. If I am threaten-
ing to throw myself off a tall building, those responsible for public safety 
will try to talk me out of it. And if I am fortunate enough to have other 
people who are close to me, they will normally concern themselves more 
comprehensively and more deeply with my welfare. It goes with this 
that other people who count my good to some extent among their pro-
jects may be angry or reproachful if I neglect it too muchY 
My good was a common project when I first learned about it; it was 
also not a completely autonomous project. As my parents' project, my 
good was not neatly isolated from all their other projects-from the good 
of the family, from the common good of the human race, or from their 
commitment to Christianity. My good was for them a part of God's will, 
a part of the common good, a part of the family's good. Making my good 
a project of theirs was not clearly distinct from accepting me as part of 
the family and part of the community. In one sense of community, one 
becomes part of a community precisely by having one's good accepted 
by the other members of the community as a project-a project not total-
ly separate from the common good-and by accepting the good of the 
community and of each other member as, to some degree, a project of 
one's own (if one is competent to form such projects). 
Still, making my good a project is not just a matter of factoring some-
thing about me into one's conception of the common good; it involves 
regarding me as a somewhat independent focus of value, so to speak. 
An individual's good is always a project or sub-project that can come 
into competition with other projects. There are contexts in which it is 
important to consider my good (or your good) separately. This is obvi-
ously the case where issues of distributive fairness arise, and where par-
ents want to take each of their children's good "equally" into account 
(perhaps not simply or exactly as a matter of fairness). 
It is possible for this separateness to be carried to an extreme, by oth-
ers or more likely by the person in question. I'could make it my project 
that I have a good life-and let the rest of the world go hang. That 
would be an alienated way of taking my own good as a project of mine. 
It would also be a form of selfishness, which clearly can in this way con-
sist in a corruption of self-love. (As Butler argued, of course, it would be 
an unpromising project too, unlikely to result in a very good life for me, 
by any plausible standard.) 
I need not make my own good such a separate project, however. It 
can be for me rather the project that I have a good life in a flourishing 
human community. That is much more like the project into which I was 
intiated by my elders when I first learned to care for my own good. The 
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tendency of much moral philosophy is to insist on distinguishing two 
separate projects here: my flourishing and the flourishing of the commu-
nity. But we might do better to see two foci in a single project-or per-
haps two projects, but each having the other as a part. 
This is not to deny that there are heroic forms of altruism that involve 
self-sacrifice, and situations in which it would be selfish not to make 
some self- sacrifice. Circumstances can certainly place my desire for my 
own good in conflict with my desire for the common good. Such a con-
flict will arise in most circumstances, indeed, if the two projects are con-
ceived as absolutely maximizing my own good, as in strict egoism, and 
absolutely maximizing some common or general good, as in strict utili-
tarianism. In an approach that seems to me healthier, however, in which 
one pursues important goods without worrying whether they are the 
best, it will often be unnecessary to break down one's desire for a good 
life in a flourishing community into separate self-interested and altruis-
tic desires. 
This may help us to see self-love as positively rather than negatively 
related to community. Fully accepting my own membership in a com-
munity involves taking my own good as a project, both as a common 
project of the community and as part of the common good. At the same 
time my good is a project that the community regards, and expects me to 
regard, as mine to care about in a special way (though not necessarily 
more than about the good of others or in isolation from the good of oth-
ers). Being willing to be special to myself in this way is appropriately 
responsive to my place in communities (not to mention my place in the 
universe). This is a relatively unalienated and unselfish way of taking 
my own good as a project. 
Yale University 
NOTES 
* This paper originated as the Joseph Butler Memorial Lecture delivered in 
Oxford on the three hundredth anniversary of Butler's birth, 18 May 1992. I am 
grateful to Oriel College, Butler's college, for the invitation to give the lecture 
and for their generous hospitality on the occasion. Versions of the paper have 
also been presented to the philosophy department of the University of 
Vermont and to a conference on virtue ethics at the University of Santa Clara, 
and as the Ruth Evelyn Parcelles Memorial Lecture at the University of 
Connecticut, 21 April 1994, and the Franklin W. Matchette Lecture at Brooklyn 
College, 5 May 1994. I am indebted to discussants on those occasions, and 
especially to Marilyn McCord Adams for her comments on a draft of the 
paper. 
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